This essay surveys general and topical literature to place the NATO campaign against Gaddafi in a historical context. The history of war as a legal idea is examined, along with the practical limitations to applying "international law" as currently espoused. The essay finds both serious practical and philosophical shortcomings inherent in modern approaches and advocates the development of a new jus cogens based on the Right to be Protected (R2BP) to address these flaws. If successfully implemented, the R2BP would represent a fundamental shift in sovereignty away from States and towards citizens, albeit vested in a professionalized United Nations office.
Introduction
Trite commentary by political and legal analysts that a particular war is "legal" or "illegal" is now commonplace. Yet what is international law and, if the US-led 2002 invasion of Iraq really was illegal, then why is GW Bush not in jail? These and other questions point to the difficulty in establishing international law qua law. The primary purpose of this essay is to provide an overview of international law as it purports to be before applying it to the facts surrounding the NATO bombing of Libya in 2011.
Research Background
On March 17, 2011, ostensibly to avert a humanitarian crisis in the Benghazi area, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 effectively authorizing NATO bombings.
1 Six months later, Colonel Gaddafi would be dead ternational law".
Finally, the essay concludes with a novel suggestion: the need for a new legal principle to restore international law and thereby avoid such ideological and interest-driven quagmires in the future. Reversing the well-known "responsibility to protect" and introducing instead a new humanitarian law principle, the "right to be protected", the essay focuses on the interests of third world citizens themselves rather than merely the intersection of first and third world interests. Thus, the new universal right, if found to exist, would not depend upon such externalities as whether or not one is located in a strategic region or a resource-rich area.
The Just War Historical Development
A discussion of the legality/illegality of war should, of course, begin at the beginning. And it appears that the earliest written code comes from Moses in the Old Testament's Book of Deuteronomy (Chapter 20), which historians have dated to the 13 th -12 th centuries BC. 6 In it, we are told that a city under siege should be offered the chance to surrender and, if accepted, the inhabitants would become the Israelites servants. However, if the city refused to surrender then the Israelites should slaughter all the adult males and take the women and children as slaves together with the property as booty. Although harsh by modern standards, these were relatively benevolent rules which applied only to peoples in distant lands. The conquered peoples within the Promised Land e.g. the Hittites, Amorites and Canaanites etc. were to be eliminated. 7 The idea of jus ad bellum could not arise: God had sanctioned war.
8
The Greeks established the Western tradition of laws of war, recognised from at least the Archaic period as unwritten rules. 9 In keeping with ancient Greek and Roman cultures, Pericles referred to violation of these rules as "shameful".
10
A pledged word must be kept, oaths were sworn to the gods and heralds and temples were sacrosanct. 11 Here we have the origins of jus ad bellum and jus in bello: war should be openly declared and oaths kept as violation would incur punishment from the gods. 12 Likewise, honour proscribed surprise attacks.
13
In The Republic (c. 380 BC), Plato devised a set of rules to limit destruction within the Hellenic sphere which Aristotle presumably responded to with greater detail in his Just Acts of War (c. 334 BC) . Unfortunately, the latter work has been lost. At a practical level, to the extent Aristotle influenced the behaviour of his pupil Alexander the Great, some of his ideas may be inferred. <http://www.historynet.com/making-rules-war.htm> accessed July 18, 2018. 7 Ibid.
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It has often been said that the ancient Greeks and Romans had shame cultures in contrast to the Jewish and Christian guilt cultures. See, for example, Gregory McNamee, "Shame vs Guilt", (Winter 2015) Vol. 91, Virginia Quarterly Review 197. 11 <http://www.historynet.com/making-rules-war.htm> accessed July 18, 2018. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid.
Picking up where the Greeks left off, the idea of Just War (bellum justum) is most closely associated with ancient Rome.
14 The most famous writer on the subject has been the Roman and early Catholic writer Saint Augustine (354-430 AD) who was strongly influenced by Greek thought and may have had access to some of Aristotle's now lost works. 15 Saint Augustine distinguished between jus ad bellum (the right to go to war) and jus in bello (right conduct within war).
For a state to have the moral right to go to war, he argued that 4 criteria had to be met: Just Authority, Just Cause, Right Intention and Last Resort. 16 As for conduct within the war, the justice of a party's behaviour would be governed by 3 factors: Proportionality, Discrimination and Responsibility. 17 Together, these core principles constitute the Just War doctrine.
Understandably, the doctrine of Just War has been controversial. On a practical level, one can argue both that it is has been followed and also that it has not been followed even where there is agreement on the facts. movement focused on a novel idea: to make war illegal.
Although the League of Nations ultimately failed to prevent war from re-occurring, it did lay the intellectual groundwork for much of what is now referred to as "international law" including the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) , the post-WWII military tribunals, the ICJ, the ICC, jus cogens, and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine.
In order to discuss the legality/illegality of war, and why such a paradigm is problematic, it is necessary to first review the key concepts and tools to which pundits refer. We will now briefly consider the key sources which "international lawyers" typically cite when discussing international law as it relates to war.
A Modern Framework of International Law
…no one knows where jus cogens comes from, no one knows whether or how or why it is part of international law, no one knows its content, no one knows how to modify it once it is articulated, and indeed no one knows whether it even exists (although it is certainly talked about a lot states, they must accept the customary rules as they exist: it does not matter that they were in no position to object when the rules were being formed.
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The non-traditional scholarship has created a hierarchy of obligations based on their contents, rather than the process by which they were created. (1995) (1996) 3 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 105.
whether particular or general. 48 Bilateral treaties are only binding on the signatories although they can give rise to customary law between them. It is said that multilateral treaties, however, can sometimes transform into sources of customary law binding on all states, even if there were a few non-signatories. 49 However, this view is controversial 50 and it is not clear how many non-signatory objectors would be required to foil the establishment of a customary rule. The traditional view held that it is a fundamental concept of treaties that they cannot bind third parties.
51 Therefore, they would also be unable to bind third parties under customary law. 52 Another advantage of conventional norms is that they are more precise than customary norms. 
Institutional Sources of Opinio Juris
If we accept the premise that international law is real, then we must consider the sources of legal opinions and a key difference between customary and conventional law is that the former relies on opinio juris as a distinguishing factor.
Aside from academia and domestic courts, the main historical and existing institutional bodies are the post-WWII War Crimes Tribunals, the United Nations, the ICJ, the ICTY, the ICTR, and the ICC. We shall examine the main contributions of each in turn. Unfortunately, however, the mistake of one activist judge often leads to another and doctrine quickly becomes law.
The United Nations
The United Nations was founded in 1945 in response to WWII and its primary purpose was to ensure such a calamity would not re-occur. Unlike the ill-fated League of Nations, majority rather than unanimous votes are generally sufficient in order for measures to pass. Importantly as well, greater deference is given to the "heavy lifters" as there are 5 Permanent Members of the Security Council who carry veto powers over resolutions that would authorize the use of force. While the UN, as an institution, appeals to the idealistic impulses of lawyers, it must be recognised that the procedural safeguards in place, such as the veto powers of the permanent Security Council members, help to ensure that important UN policies generally incorporate realpolitik concerns.
Some scholars, such as Tunkin, wished for the Charter of the United Nations to be accepted by international lawyers as a kind of "constitution" of the international community. 54 I would argue that, unfortunately, they have largely succeeded.
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Baker, (n 41) 177.
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See my comments above on the common law.
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Bilder, (n 34) 161.
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53 Tunkin (1993) , "Is General International Law Customary Law Only?" 4 EJIL 534 at 540. 54 Ibid 541. One of the problems, it is submitted, is that just as there is no international legal licensing system, so too there is no international law proper. Instead, a system of domestic licensing tends to foster domestic conceptions of natural law i.e. "the Good" onto an international setting. In the European context we can see how EU law offers a mishmash but democratically tends towards civil
Post-WWII Military Tribunals
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg was created in 1945 to prosecute (German) individuals for "crimes against peace", "war crimes" and "crimes against humanity". This 
International Court of Justice (ICJ)
The ICJ was established in 1945 to adjudicate State-to-State disputes. International law comes primarily from Article 38(1) of the ICJ statute.
56
In the Nicaragua case, due to the US reservation (i.e. the Vandenberg reservation) the Court could not rely on the UN Charter for its authority and was therefore compelled instead to base its decision on customary and general principles of international law regarding the use of force. 57 The Court held that the prohibition on the use of force contained in the UN's Charter Article 2(4) had attained the status of a jus cogen norm.
58 However, identifying a customary international law in this way is ambiguous because of the very nature of its designation.
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Nicaragua claimed that the US had violated the international rule prohibiting the use of force between States. The Court ruled in Nicaragua's favour, even though the US had withdrawn from the proceedings after it had had its challenge to the Court's jurisdiction rejected.
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The only caveat established in Nicaragua is that there must be no inconsistent practice (as opposed to the holding in the North Sea, in which the Court had and Catholic rather than common law and Protestant solutions. On some level, reaction against this imposed system and its values may have been a factor in the UK's Brexit decision.
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As even Cherif Bassiouni notes, however, "acceptable terminology" in this area changes over time. See Bassiouni (1983) said there needed to be consistent State practice). In the North Sea, the Court held that there had to be some showing of opinio juris establishing that the behaviour observed had transformed the conventional norm into a customary one.
61
The best way to understand the Nicaragua decision is to recall that 1) the Court is politicized even when it tries to appear not to be and 2) the decision was pre-R2P. Today, given the wide acceptance of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) norm, it is possible the Court would rule differently. Baker, (n 41) 199.
ICTR and ICTY as Sources of Customary International Law
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For the time being, aggression is incapable of being prosecuted. Yet to label something a most serious crime while still being unable to define it is a curious thing, to say the least. See also Mark A Drumbl (2008) , "A hard look at the soft theory of international criminal law" in Leila Nadya Sadat 
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In practice, it may be that the ICC, as a leading institution of international law, falls short on the delivery of one of the key requirements of law: to apply the law fairly and equally.
Jus Cogens and Peremptory Norms
Jus cogens refers to the legal status that certain crimes reach while obligatio erga omnes relates to the legal implications arising from the crime's characterisation as jus cogens. 69 Jus cogens means "compelling law" and the jus cogens norm holds the highest position among all norms and principles. 70 Recognising certain international crimes as jus cogens carries with it an obligation to prosecute or 66
It is also possible for the ICC to have jurisdiction over non-Party nationals if: 1) the UNSC so authorizes, or 2) the crimes were committed within the territory of a Party that accepts the jurisdiction of the ICC or 3) a non-Party state has consented to the Court's jurisdiction. See Mohochi There seem to be two issues here: 1) narrow vs wide conceptions of international law and 2) whether universal jurisdiction gives rise to a special category of jus cogens or not. The narrow conception considers "law" to be only that which has been agreed to while the wide view adopts both that which has been agreed and also what should be agreed (i.e. both the lex lata and the lex ferenda).
If the wide view is adopted, a substantive test would be required to convert the lex lata into lex ferenda. But in that case, could the law be set by a simple majority, a massive majority or only unanimity? Most scholars hedge by saying at least an overwhelming, yet undefined, majority 85 although Article 53 of the Vienna Convention seems to suggest unanimity. Ultimately, the question revolves around whether general international law and universal international law really mean the same thing. 
Universal Jurisdiction and Jus Cogens
The following international crimes are said to be jus cogens: aggression, genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, piracy, slavery and slave-related practices and torture.
87
The ICJ has held that the prohibition against genocide is a jus cogens norm against which it is not possible to reserve or derogate from. 88 And it may be that treaties and customary rules contrary to jus cogens are invalid ab initio.
89 However, if undertaken, would the entire treaty be void or only the relevant provisions? This is unclear as the Court has generally avoided using the termjus cogens. Gulgec, (n 30) 98. 87 Bassiouni, (n 69) 68. 88 Ibid 71. 89 Gulgec, (n 30) 88, as per Art 53 of the Vienna Convention. 90 Gulgec (n 30) 82-83. The Court prefers the (wider) term erga omnes to jus cogens. crimes. 92 In practice, however, the complementarity principle usually limits application of universal jurisdiction (since home courts often assert jurisdiction, thereby displacing the ICC). The claim of custom as a source of international law seems particularly circular, essentially stating that it is law because it is followed, and also, because it is followed, it is law. 
Rethinking Jus Cogens
Responsibility to Protect (R2P)
Sudanese scholar and diplomat Francis Deng inverted the premise of the jus cogens norm from "right to intervene" to "Responsibility to Protect (R2P and by some activists with respect to post-cyclone Burma.
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R2P
is not yet a rule of customary law but it is a new international norm according to the former ICISS co-chair and Labour politician Gareth Evans. Yugoslavian civil war have been the result of many decades of managed frustrations finally exploding at the first crack of freedom? It seems that under the "Soviet-lite" model proposed by Evans, putting some additional pressure on the pressure cooker is the preferred solution because such outside pressure might be needed to solve the "internal problem". And yet, this bizarre and oppressive logic perfectly encapsulates the thought process behind many R2P supporters' wish to control "hate speech".
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It appears that R2P supporters can be divided into minimalists and maximalists, based on how much support they would give and how early they would intervene. 114 The maximalists like Evans seem to support thought control under the guise of controlling hate speech, since "thinking bad thoughts" and "saying bad things" is presumably the cause of much conflict. (If nothing else, perhaps
Evans also knows how to prevent middle-aged divorce?) Minimalists would wait until hostilities were at least imminent or had already begun before intervening.
Unfortunately, only four black sheep countries (Venezuela, Cuba, Nicaragua and Sudan) have sought to roll back the R2P consensus in favour of unqualified state sovereignty. 
Applying the Framework to the Facts: International Law and NATO's Libyan Adventure
We came, we saw, he died… (laughter). 116 Hillary Clinton
Libya under Gaddafi (1969-2010)
In 1969, at the age of 27, the Arab nationalist and socialist-later "Colonel"-Muammar Gaddafi became the leader of Libya. Given his ambitions, he supported terrorist groups abroad and, over the years, according to numerous reports, provided money or safe haven to various groups dedicated to the destruction of Israel. 117 In 1984 he declared a right and a capability to export terrorism to the US; and in 1985 a Libyan diplomat at the UN was declared persona non grata in connection with a plot to kill Libyan dissidents in the US.
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In the early hours of April 15, 1986, US Air Force and Naval aircraft simultaneously bombed targets within Libya. 119 In total, thirty-seven people, including 113 Gagro, 66. The dominant ideology holds that the Holocaust and Rwanda genocides started with hate speech, discrimination and marginalization. I would argue instead, however, that the real instigator of such atrocities was a strong sense of group identity among the perpetuators followed by feelings of past victimisation and fear of further victimisation. 114 Stark, (n 102) 33. 115 Ibid 39. 116 <https://www.collective-evolution.com/2016/10/20/we-came-we-saw-he-died-how-gaddafi-was-h unted-ruthlessly-killed/> accessed 31 July 2018. The CBS video of Secretary Clinton laughing has become harder to find but can still be found here: <https://www.globalresearch.ca/hillarys-war-crime-the-murder-of-muammar-gaddafi-we-came-we -saw-he-died/5552094> accessed 31 July 2018.
Gaddafi's four-year-old adopted daughter, were killed and ninety-three injured. 120 The US and Canada also imposed sanctions on Libya, in retaliation for bombings that took place in Rome and Vienna on December 27, 1985 and which they attributed to the Libyan government. 121 However, most European countries refused to impose sanctions for reasons that ranged from a belief that they would not be effective in countering terrorism (Margaret Thatcher) to concerns over the safety of German expatriates (Helmut Kohl).
122
America's unilateral strike was widely condemned and there was much ensuing public debate over its legality. Under the norms in place at the time, the consensus view was that such an attack, if done only as a retaliatory measure, would be illegal. As well, the US was under an obligation to employ all peaceful methods available to it in resolving the problem of Libyan terrorism. 123 However, it was also argued that if done in self-defence, perhaps even pre-emptively, then the airstrike would have been legally permitted.
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In 1988 Pan Am Flight 103, en route from London to New York blew up over Lockerbie, Scotland. Referred to in the Western media as the "Lockerbie bombing", it eventually resulted in the conviction of the suspected intelligence official Abdelbaset Ali Mohmed al-Megrahi on 270 counts of murder. 125 The Libyan official always maintained his innocence although western media reports speculated that the bombing had been motivated by a Libyan desire for revenge after the April 15, 1986 US aerial bombings. The late 2000s also saw Gaddafi's nascent personal rehabilitation on the world stage. He renounced terrorism and was able to visit Paris and London. Many Western governments also eagerly hoped to make contracts or support investment in the Libyan petroleum sector. For Gaddafi personally, and Libyans generally, the future seemed bright. 
Surprising Denouement-R2P in Practice
On December 17, 2010, Mohamed Bouazizi self-immolated himself in an act of protest in Tunisia. The following month, the country's long time President, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, would be compelled to resign. This was followed by populist challenges to authority in several other Arab countries, in what has been referred to as the "Arab Spring".
Given the ethnic divisions which exist in Libya, it is perhaps unsurprising that the uprising would find greatest support in Benghazi, some 404 miles from Tripoli. In response to the uprising, Gaddafi began mobilizing his troops en route towards Benghazi, no doubt with the intention of crushing the insurrection. Before the rebellion could be put down, however, the UN Security Council passed Resolutions 1970 and 1973. Although evidence on the ground of Libyan compliance was mixed, Western leaders labelled Gaddafi a liar and, under the guise of protecting the people of Benghazi, rushed to war. 128 In fact, however, Gaddafi made many extraordinary offers to avoid war, including a willingness to accept international monitors, and to step down and leave the country, all of which were rejected. 
Legality of the Coalition and NATO Attacks
The decision to use the humanitarian crisis in Libya to force through regime change is surprising. That the Western policy towards Libya was a failure (aside from its success in 137 Ibid for the student of history, this is doubly ironic as Barrack Obama himself had been elected in 2008 on a promise to "follow the law" and "end torture" in the form of waterboarding by the US government. However, GW Bush had at one point similarly relied on dubious internal legal advice that determined waterboarding was "not torture", but simply an enhanced interrogation technique, under international law. Ibid.
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Ibid. "As things stand, NATO has developed the ability to step into the UN Charter (to assist the Security Council implementing its resolutions) and step out of it (to avoid the Security Council's regulation of regional organizations engaged in implementing such resolutions." 144 Ibid. 145 There are some key differences. In Afghanistan, the local Taliban had been harbouring Osama Bin Laden and NATO could claim to be acting in collective self-defence as one of its members, the US, had been attacked. 
Conclusion
The international legal order as it stands now is in a highly dissatisfying place.
For those of us who still believe that power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely, the idea of a one world government enforcing a unified conception of "international law" is a highly disconcerting prospect. In fact, it is difficult to envision such a government bringing about ever increasing "international standards" and "global norms" without also becoming increasingly totalitarian. And yet, moving towards such a world seems to have been the trend for most of the post-WWII era. Perhaps even more disturbingly, the idea of "global norms" appears as little more than an empty shell, a circular, self-referential and at times evolving tautological construct that supports or opposes whatever conceptual its advocate holds.
On the other hand, for those who do believe in international law, dealing with the shortcomings of the status quo must be equally frustrating. The dream of international law is understandable. For lawyers, it offers a way to bypass the problem of corrupt third world institutions and overrides domestic procedural safeguards without fixing them. And for progressive globalists, the goal of a conflict-free world living in harmony will always appear ever achievable.
As we have seen with the NATO campaign in Libya, a case can be made that the campaign was both legal and necessary in order to uphold international law.
However, that case would be an extremely weak one. The better view seems to be that international law as currently practiced does not really reflect law so much as politics, nor rights so much as interests, and in particular it is the confluence of interests and public opinion in centers of power which ultimately holds sway.
It could also be said that the natural law conception of international law, like jus cogens, does not exist at all, except perhaps in the minds of some lawyers and social activists. Indeed, the case for international law can be a difficult one.
Without it, ordinary countries might act with impunity. But, under the fractured enforcement mechanism in place now, only politically or militarily weak players are bound: strong countries can still afford to ignore it.
Replacing the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) with the Right to be Protected (R2BP) would not fix international law overnight and, given the difficulty in establishing an objective international law, might not even be workable. But, if nothing else, the R2BP should, hopefully, either succeed in professionalizing both the UN and the application of international law by shedding light on the obscure or fail so completely as to finally expose the hypocrisy of the major powers and the political nature of international law. Either way, bringing clarity to the muddy waters underlying international law would be a step in the right direction.
Epilogue
The recent uncovering of new evidence in relation to former President Sarkozy's dealings with Libya and his subsequent, extensive questioning by French police must be seen as a positive development. 164 As well, the June 12, 2018 summit between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump has drawn attention to the importance of learning from the Libyan fiasco. Although many of the discussions were held in secret, it can be inferred that the Chinese government has highlighted, as a warning, the remarkable similarities between the North Korean and Libyan rehabilitations.
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